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1.0 Introduction 
Both Schopenhauer and Gadamer are in their own ways reactions to Kant. 
It is therefore useful to open this paper by contextualizing them vis-a-vis their 
relationship to him, pointing out briefly what they inherit and how they respond 
to the Kantian legacy. 
Kant's two critiques had explored the nature of theoretical and practical 
reason, but the end result was a seemingly unbridgeable gap between the two 
realms. On the one hand, the CritiqUB 0/ Pure Reason dealt with the limits of 
our understanding of the world of nature, whilst the Critique o/Practical 
Reason dealt with the moral domain. The former domain of unfree, determined 
objects was antithetical to the latter where freedom was a prequisite for moral 
behaviour. The irreconcilable world of subject and object - itself a major 
concern to subsequent German Idealists - was mediated by an aesthetic 
realm. Thus with the Critique 0/ Judgement Kant can also be considered as 
proposing a system-building philosophy within which aesthetics played an 
important role. And although Kant denied adding a third autonomous, aesthetic 
realm I this was how he was subsequently read. 
Even though Schopenhauer admired Kant's first two critiques, he had little 
to say about the last. In fact, in his review of Kant's works, the Critique 0/ 
Judgement is virtually dismissed. He accuses Kant of having missed the point 
in focusing upon the conditions enabling one to pass a judgment on the 
beautiful rather than the beautiful object of perception itself. Kant focussed on 
judgements of taste for he was primarily interested in what occurred in the 
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subject By llarting with the subject, Schopenhauer accuses Kant of learning 
about the beautiful from the statements of others. 
Despite dismissing Kant's Critique of Judgement, the other works remain 
anin.1 in Schopenbauer's eyes. Although he accepts the Kantian distinction 
of the phenomenal and noumenal world, he realizes that the way Kant 
formulates this distinction is not tenable, for Kant illegitimately postulates the 
noumenon as a kind of invisible object 'behind' the phenomenal world. On 
Kant's own premises only the objects of experience i.e. the phenomena are 
. ,'; ~owable, and hence the noumena is unknowable. 
However Schopenhauer did not eliminate altogether the Kantian 
thiiig-in-itseif. He argued that it was in fact knowable. Direct acquaintance of 
the thing-in-itself was achieved in the act of self-consciousness. In looking at 
our inner world, Schopenhauer argues that the motivational force of behaviour 
is the wiU.2 The thing-in-itselfis identified as the will, which in tum expressed 
itself in phenomena. However, Schopenhauer did not maintain a dualistic 
world view. The body was the expression of the will, but the latter was not the 
causal producer of the former. Rather, the body and other phenomena in the 
world were external objectifications of the world subject to conditions of 
ordinary perception. From this standpoint the body is an object amongst other 
objects. Whilst Hegel considered the Absolute to be the ultimate reality, the 
culmination of reason, Schopenhauer's wile also constituted the ultimate 
reality, but as a nonrational force, without any teleological designs. It is the 
will's nature that makes Schopenhauer look upon life as a miserable affair. 
The will strives to fulfill its desires, but for every desire fulfilled another ten 
take its place, prompting the will into further activity. This cycle of desires is 
temporarily satiated, but constantly renewed. As a result life becomes an arena 
of interminable suffering. Temporary liberation from the striving of the will is 
possible through the experience of the beautiful, whether natural or artistic. In 
this experience the subject comes into contact with the Platonic Ideas or the 
will itself, depending on the artform. Acquaintance of these is what constitutes 
knowledge and truth. 
2. B. Magee describes the will in tenns of 'energy': "it is nonhuman and impersonal. without 
consciousness, without aims and perhaps- the most important of all - without life," The 
Philosophy ofSchopenhauer, (Clarendon Press; Oxford 1983) 144. 
3. Bo~o points out that Schopenhauer's introduction of the will is not as original as is widely 
bolicv~. Schelling for example, had already claimed, "as the object is never absolute then 
lOIIlethin~ per ~ non-objective must be posited in nature: this absolutely non-objective 
postulate IS precIsely the original productivity of nature. " Cited from A. Bowie, Aesthetics 
tIIId Subjeclivity:from Kant to Nietzsche, (Manchester University Press; Manchester 1990) 
206. 
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Gadamer also has his starting point rooted in Kant. It is he whom Gadamer 
holds responsible for the situation where one no longer speaks of truth ad 
knowledge in art. With Kant, aesthetics became subjective for consideratiODI 
of aesthetic judgments were based not on the nature of the object, but on the 
subject who synthesized the plurality of impressions confronting him, either 
as a creator or as a beholder. 
In the Critique of Judgement Kant attempts to resolve a difficult situation. 
Judgements of taste and beauty are subjective for they are related to the 
individual's delight. Pleasure in the beautiful is not acquired through' 
conceptualization or reflection. If this were the case, then it would be merely 
a question of learning the correct rules of procedure for solving questions of 
taste and beauty. The subjective element excluded the possibility of aesthetics 
becoming part of Kant's critical philosophy. 
The other problem Kant needed to resolve was how agreement wiS 
possible on questions of taste. This couldn't be established by induction i.e., 
by seeing how many people agree on a particular object as beautiful. What 
Kant wanted was to show that a judgement of the beautiful was such that it 
commanded the agreement of others. Thus Kant needed to establish a position 
where both the subjective and the universal aspects were fulfilled. 
Kant's paradigm for the beautiful is nature. It presents itself immediately, 
unmediated by concepts, whose beauty is in-itself without reference to our 
purposes. Artistic beauty supplements natural beauty in that the latter is 
invigorated by the genius's free play of his mental faculties i.e., the imagination 
and the understanding. However, although his source is nature, the genius 
presents an idealized version of nature, so that his added contribution becomes 
a reflection on man himself. This talent cannot be learnt by following rules, so 
that in the artistic depiction of natural beauty man recognizes simi1arities 
between himself and nature, since nature too is devoid of rules, concepti' and 
deliberate purposes. 
As a result of Kant's Critique of Judgement, aesthetic discourse became 
subjective, claiming an area independent of considerations on knowledge and 
truth, focussing on 'taste' and 'feeling'. This is the point Gadamer is stressing. 
In delineating truth and knowledge within the framework of the 'natural 
sciences, Kant closed the doors of truth and knowledge to art. 
Thus, both for Gadamer and Schopenhauer, the experience of art iss 
source of knowledge and truth. However, whilst thei(' claims seem to be 
similar, the content of their claims differs. It is this difference which this paper 
sets out to explore, . . t 
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2.0 Truth lI"d knowledge in tu1 
In the following sections I shall be considering points of contact between 
Schopenhauer and Gadamer, namely the claims to truth and knowledge in art, 
the aesthetic experience and their preoccupations with genius. That I have 
focussed on these particular issues is not an arbitrary choice, but was imposed 
upon me by the authors themselves who formulate their positions around these 
themes. 
The interesting aspect of Schopenhauerian aesthetics is its ambivalent 
. position when contrasted to Gadamer's aesthetics. Like Gadamer, (and unlike 
Kant) he talks about truth and knowledge in the experience of art, so that it is 
on 'questions of what kind of truth and knowledge that they differ. Yet 
Schopenhauer also makes the additional claim as to the eternal nature of artistic 
and natural beauty. Gadamer makes no such claims, but on the contrary argues 
in Truth and Method that 'raising' beauty to an eternal standpoint leads to the 
dislocation of the work of art from the double world of its and the viewer's 
context. 
Gadamer's historical survey points to Schiller as being responsible for 
producing what he calls the aesthetic consciousness of differentiation. With 
Schiller, the word aesthetic changed its meaning from that used by Kant for 
his transcendental aesthetics. Kant's transcendentaijustification enabling one 
to pass ajudgement of taste was transformed from a methodological condition 
to one of content, to the imperative of adopting an aesthetic attitude to things . 
. Despite the influence of Kant, Schiller's proclamation of art as freedom 
ultimately drew its resources from Fichte. Schiller was not referring to the 
KaQ.tian free-play of cognitive faculties, but rather drawing upon Fichte's 
theory of instinct. The Schillerian play-impulse involved the harmony of the 
form impulse and the matter impulse; whilst the form impulse strives for unity 
an~:persistence, the matter impulse strives for change. These drives are 
controlled and harmonized by the play impulse. It is with art that the play 
impulse was brought out. Aesthetic education aimed at developing this 
inatinct. An important consequence ensued: art claimed its own standpoint and 
~blished its supremacy. The art of the beautiful appearance was contrasted 
with reality. Nature and art no longer complemented each other, but were 
. ~ leaving art as an autonomous sphere. The laws of beauty as the 
~t1III[lOn of art, permit "nature" and "reality" to be transcended. Schiller's 
__ :e·of the "ideal kingdom" of art against all limitation - both political 
_oral - led to the culture of an "aesthetic state" where an educated 
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society was interested in art. Thus, the reality which Schiller opposed art to, is 
no longer the same concept of reality used by Kant. 
According to Schiller the aesthetic world was defmed in terms of imitation, 
irreality, illusion, magic or dream. It was opposed to the 'real' world. The 
ontological definition of aesthetic appearance was formulated at that moment 
when the scientific-epistemological model excluded any other form of 
knowledge outside its own method. Aesthetic consciousness became alienated 
from reality. It was a consciousness characterizing the educated society, for in 
such a community its members shared the same features, namely an ability to 
raise oneself to the universal, by negating those criteria of taste which mark a 
particular community. 
Furthermore, there was a second mode of being of this aesthetic 
consciousness: the divorce of the work from its original context - its world. 
Schiller's aesthetic consciousness no longer recognizes the importance of 
content or the relation of the work of art with its world. Anything which has 
particular qualities determined as aesthetic belong to the aesthetic 
consciousness. It has become the centre towards which works are measured as 
art. The Schillerian notion of aesthetic consciousness is called by Gadamer 
aesthetic differentiation. It is a process where everything in which a work is 
rooted - original context of. life, religious or secular function - is 
disregarded. 
Differentiation is that abstractive process which selects in relation to the 
aesthetic quality. Extra-aesthetic elements, such as purpose, function, the 
meaning of its content, are excluded from considerations of the artistic nature 
of the work. By force of its exclusions, the viewer is prevented from taking 
any moral or religious attitudes with him towards the work i.e., he supposedly 
approached the work without any preconceptions and prejudices. Furthermore, 
when the aesthetic consciousness is applied to the performative arts, .for 
example music and drama, a difference is made between the original as 
opposed to its reproduction. Both - providing they fulfIll aesthetic criteria -
are deemed independent of each other. Their interpretation is no longer related 
to the original: each is contemplated aesthetically. 
The implication of this view is described by Gadamer as having "the 
character of simultaneity. ,,4 The double differentiation - of work from its 
world and beholder from his attitudes - simultaneously raises works of art of 
all times to a co-present in the mind of the beholder. Rather than a localization 
4. H.O. Oadarner, Truth and Method, (Sheen and Ward; London 1975) 77. 
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of1llte, de1mmined by the criteria upheld by the beholder's world, art becomes 
etemal with aesthetic differentiation. The art of all ages is integrated into the 
co-preaentne .. of aesthetic differentiation. Its embodiment has taken place in 
the tODD. of tho library or the museum: the art of all ages is lumped together in 
ODe building, with the consequence that the aesthetic consciousness adopts a 
1IItele .. attitude. Even architecture, which might be considered as resistant to 
aesthetic differentiation, succumbs to aesthetic consciousness with buildings 
re-produced as pictures. 
Aesthetic differentiation is that attempt to raise art to the standpoint of 
.. eternity; but it is a standpoint which is opposed to the Kantian delineation of 
, reality. and consequently excludes ascribing questions of truth and knowledge 
to art. Schopenbauer in tum considers the experience of art to be an experience 
,of the eternal: "[art] stops the wheel oftime."s With his contemporaries he 
400ked upon art as ttanshistorical. Yet unlike them, he also looked upon art as 
the source of truth and knowledge. 
, It is in this context that Platonic Ideas -'the objective aspect of the 
aesthetic experience - are introduced.6 At first sight he seems to be 
introducing a piece of alien ontology into his world-view for he claimed that 
reality is an indivisible will which however manifests itself in the world of 
phenomenon. It has been pointed out' that Schopenhauer does not explain why 
the will needs to objectify itself in space and time at all, given that the will is 
all that there is i.e., ultimate reality. But I think that even without involving 
ourselves too deeply in his metaphysics, one could argue that the will's 
inexhaustible desire for life leads to it manifesting itself in whatever form 
pbssible, It is its own striving nature that makes it enter into the phenomenal 
world, subj ect to the limitations of space, time and causality. 
When Schopenbauer writes that the will objectifies itself into the world, 
this self-manifestation is graded into four categories: inorganic matter. vegetal 
life, animal, and human life. Man is at the top of this hierarchy on the grounds 
, . that through him knowledge of the will is most easily acquired. The 
phenomenal world is for Schopenbauer the "indirect objectification of the 
! 
S.. ~. Schopenhauer, The World as WiD and Representation, (Dover Publications; New York 
1969) 18S. 
6. Schopcnhaueruses 'aesthetic contemplation' and the 'aesthetic experience' synonymously. 
7. D.W. Hamlyn, Schopenhmler, (Routledge and Kegan Paul; London 1980) 110.115; F. 
Copclston, Schopenhauer: Philosopher of pessimism, (Bums Oates and Washboume; 
London 1946) lOS. 
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will."S And yet, despite the plentitude of objects found in the world, 
Schopenbauer is adamant that the will is not divided into each such that the 
result is the. complete will. Rather the will is present in each of them. It is 
indivisible such that "if per impossible, a single being, even the most 
insignificant, were entirely annihilated, the whole world would inevitably be 
destroyed with it. ,,9 
~;' 
And here we have the crux of the problem which Schopenbauer is faced 
with, namely how to reconcile an indivisible atemporal will with a plurality of 
objects in space and time. In this, I will try to show how he is successful, 
although his recourse to the Platonic Ideas seems to be located in a desire to .. 
include aesthetics within his system, a procedure not uncommon in his days, 
as exemplified in the metaphysics of Hegel, Fichte and Schelling. . 
The Platonic Ideas are meant to have a mediatory role between the 
different realms of the will and the world. The uneasiness which accompanies 
us into thinking of the Platonic Ideas as constituting a separate set of beings is ' 
partly due to Schopenbauer's insistence upon calling them Platonic Ideas: 
"these grades of the objectification of the will are nothing but Plato's Ideas. ,,10 
Perhaps Schopenbauer's insistence upon calling them the Platonic Ideas is to 
help avoid confusing them with the world as representation. All knowledge of 
the world is mediated by the senses and the intellect. What we know of the 
world in ordinary consciousness is its representation. Th~ Platonic Ideas differ 
from the world as representation in that the latter is expressed through the forms 
of space, time and causality. The Platonic Ideas, though numerous are 
atemporal. This is what they have in common with the will. . • 
The similarity between Plato's and Schopenbauer's Ideas lies in their 
structural nature: both are the essential features of things. The things 
themselves, precisely because they are subject to those conditions constitutive 
of the world, appear as a plurality of phenomena in their inessential features: 
to the brook which rolls downwards over the stones, the eddies, waves 
and foam -forms are exhibited by it are indifferent and inessential; but 
that it follows gravity, and behaves as an inelastic, perfectly mobile, 
8, A. Schopenhauer. The World as Will and RepresenUlJion. (Dover Publications; New York 
1969) 175. 
9. Ibid .• 128·129. 
10. Ibid., 129. 
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formless and transparent fluid, this is its essential nature, this, if 
known through perception, is the Idea 11 
Yet despite this point of contact between Plato and Schopenhauer, there 
remain two fundamental differences. Firstly, whilst Plato's Ideas are the 
ultimate reality, for Schopenhauer this reality is the will. Secondly, Plato's 
Ideas are abstract, Schopenhauer's Ideas are apprehended in perception. 12 
It is the relationship between the Platonic Ideas and the world that still 
needs to be examined. In one respect, they are like the concept: "both unities 
represent a plurality of things.,,1 But in other respects, the analogy fails, for 
the concept is abstract, the product of reason, exhausted in its defmition; 14 so 
too the concept is figuratively speaking "a dead receptacle", the Platonic Idea 
a living organism. IS Moreover, Schopenhauer indicates the difference between 
concept and Platonic Idea in terms of their direction: the Idea is the unity that 
has fallen into plurality by virtue of the temporal and spatial form of our 
intuitive apprehension. The concept, on the oth~r hand, is the unity once more 
. produced out of plurality by means of abstraction through our faculty of 
reason. 16 
This I think provides a good indicator of how the will manifests itself in 
the world via the Platonic Ideas. It explains why Schopenhauer considers the 
world as the indirect manifestation of the will, given that the Platonic Ideas 
ate its direct manifestation. 
On the other hand, when he writes that phenomenon 'fall' through the 
Platonic Ideas, it is not as though the Platonic Ideas are wholly segregated from 
things. They differ in being atemporal, outside the forms of space, time and 
~usality. But they are perceived - as Schopenhauer will show in his 
examination of the arts - via the phenomenal objects. This leads back to the 
. -different grades of objectifications of the will. Not all the Platonic Ideas are 
the same, for those with the more complex life forms appear with "increasing 
11. Ibid., 182-
12. AI T.J. Diffey writes, "whatever Plato's forms are, they could not be objcx:ts of perception, .. 
"Schopenhauer's Acoount of Aesthetic Experience," BritishJOUITIaJ of Aesthetics, 30(April 
199012)135. 
!3. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representalion, 233. 
14. Ibid .. 234. 
IS. Ibid., 235. 
16. Ibid., 234-235. 
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distinctness and completeness. 11 Moreover, Schopenhauer makes a distinction 
between the Platonic Ideas of man and the Platonic Ideas of the animal and 
vegetal worlds: "the farther down we go, the more completely is every trace 
of individual character lost in the general character of the species and only the 
physiognomy of the species remains. ,,18 
Whilst with animals and plants there is no difference between the species 
and their character, each man instantiates his own Idea on account of his unique 
character: "the character of each individual man, in so far as it is thoroughly 
individual and not entirely included in that of the species can be regarded as a 
special Idea, corresponding to a particular act of objectification of the will. "HI 
This point is important for it shows that D.H. Hamlyn is wrong in claiming 
that there is an individual Idea for every particular object.20 It is only in the 
case of man that the Platonic Idea is both token and type. This should not be 
confused with the further claim Schopenbauer makes when he writes that every 
object can be perceived as an Idea, "whether it be a landscape, a tree, a rock, 
a crag, a building, or anything else. ,,21 This is not a claim about the nature of 
the relationship between the Platonic Ideas and particulars. It is a claim about 
what is eligible to become the object of aesthetic contemplation. Schopenhauer 
is arguing that every object which manifests itself as a Platonic Idea can be 
called beautiful. 
Even in the inorganic world and in manufactured products, the will is still 
manifesting itself, and hence contemplation of the Idea of their beauty remains 
possible. In the case Schopenbauer cites i.e., of manufactured products, he 
argues against Plato's refusal to ascnbe Ideas to manufactured articles. Thus, 
whereas for Plato there was no Idea of table, Schopenhauer conceded the Idea 
of table but only as an expression of its matter. There could be no perception 
of matter as an Idea, for pure, unformed matter would be an exercise in 
abstraction. Yet despite the fact that all objects can be potentially classified as 
beautiful, some are more beautiful that others. The more beautiful ones are 
those which facilitate the transition form object to Idea. Human beauty 
17. Ibid., 169. 
18. Ibid., 131. 
19. Ibid., IS8. 
20. Hamlyn writes: "it [the Platonic Idea of the oak tree] is an ideal entity, something that is 
bolh token and type", Scbopenhauer 106. 
21. Scbopenhauer, '!'luI World as WiU and Representation, 166. 
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facilitates this transition "man is (the) more beautiful than all other objects and 
the revelation of his more inner nature is the highest aim of art ,,22 
Art is the medium through which the various Platonic Ideas are perceived. 
Schopenhauer has successfully bridged the noumenal and phenomenal world 
without creating a new realm. Like the will, the Platonic Ideas are atemporal;23 
like the phenomenal world, these Ideas are objects of representation i.e., they 
require a subject for their perception. Since they are atemporal, our ordinary 
mode of cognition cannot apprehend them. It is in the aesthetic experience that 
the perception of these Ideas is possible, for this experience necessitates a 
.c~ge in the subject where his condition as a willing subject is temporally 
eliminated. 
Knowledge of the Ideas is knowledge about the true nature of reality i.e., 
the will, for the Platonic are the "immediate and adequate objectivity of the 
thing-in-itself, of the will. ,,24 Artistic beauty is preferred to natural beauty for 
in art the knowledge of the Ideas is communicated. However, in claiming that 
the experience of the beautiful is the perce~on of the Idea, Schopenhauer has 
raised works of art to an eternal standpoint. Art becomes the medium through 
which we transcend both its original world and our world. This is the view 
Gadamer argues against in his critique of aesthetic differentiation. 
Schopenhauer's position is precisely the position Gadarner attacks in his 
critique of the notion of aesthetic consciousness. He takes as his starting point 
the work ofR. Harnaan. In the Aesthetic, Harnaan takes aesthetic differentiation 
to its extreme, abstracting it from art itself. By starting with an analysis of 
perception without any relation to something else, pure aesthetic experience 
bas been transformed into pure perception. But Gadarner argues against the 
idea of pure perception, drawing upon Aristotle's point that all sense 
perception tends to a universal. Whatever is perceived is so in relation to 
sQmething universal: a white phenomenon is seen as man, the noise we hear 
of a car hooting is its hom, not pure sound. 26 The importance this brings out is 
22. Ibid., 210. 
23. This is why Magee is WTong when he writes "if plural, [the Platonic Ideas] must be within 
the the phenomenal world not outside it", The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, (Clarendon 
Press; Oxford 1983) 148. 
24. Schopenhauer The World as Will and Representation, 148. 
25. On Schopenhauer's account the Idea perceived in natural beauty is also eternal; however, 
it differs from works of art in that the latter are produced by genius and can 1herefore make 
. a claim to eternity in the sense of timelessness i.e., irrespective of context. 
26. So too a further argument against the idea of pure perception is that the form ofHfe from 
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that perception can never be a mirror image; the idea of pure perception iI 
impossible because perception is always meaningful. It is the understandiq 
of something as something: "all understanding as .... is an articulation of what 
is there. ,,27 The criticism of the idea of pure perception is also a criticism of , 
aesthetic consciousness, for given that there is no such thing as pure perception, 
i.e., no abstraction from meaningful contexts, then the notion of pure art 
collapses. 
Objects looked at aesthetically are not looked at as a simple case of what 
there is but are dwelt upon and assimilated. In the case of works of plastic art 
(excluding non-representational and abstract art), recognizing what is 
represented enables us to understand the picture. "Seeing," Gadamer notes, . 
"means differentiation.,,28 There is no perception without meaning. The 
interpretation of a work of art is the perception of it as something. Interpretation 
belongs to the work of art. It is not some thing that can be separated from the 
work: thus, for Gadamer, the aesthetic experience becomes a hermeneu~cal 
one. Consequently, the interpretation of art isa way out of the view of aesthetio 
consciousness, for it shows how a work of art is always linked to meaning and 
this is in turn determined by context. 
The question of how a work of art should be interpreted can be traced back 
to Kant's adoption of the concept of genius as the creator of art. The fonnalism 
which Kant upheld in the Critique of Judgement was not that of a pure 
perception; it was not of form without meaningful content, but of form as the 
unity of meaning. Form is here opposed to the purely sensuous attraction of 
the material in the work of art. Kant's examples of the arabesque are purely 
methodological, but not the aesthetic ideal. In order to achieve this ideal Kant 
relied upon the concept of genius. This concept has had far reaching 
implications for even when it declined in the eighteenth century, its influence 
continued through to the nineteenth century. although instead of bomg 
conceived of by the artist, it was then confinned by the observer. The critic~l 
observer saw the work as miraculous, as a product inspired by genius. ~d 
though artists acclaimed this view, they were more down to earth, consideriDg 
questions of technique and of success. 
Yet even if the Romantic concept of genius as an unconscious producer is 
eliminated, the problem remains: how - if genius is excluded as defining the 
which we come, i.e .. our linguistic background influences our way of perceiving 1110 world. 
27. Gadamer, Truth and Method, SI. 
2S. Ibid., 82. 
" 
.t"· 
" 
70 CLAUDE MANOION 
work of art - is the difference to be enacted between art and craft? A work 
becomes a work when it is able to fulfill its purpose. Its use detennines whether 
it has been completed. But this criterion is inapplicable to the artwork. Use 
does not answer the question of what the work of art is. Lack of purpose (end) 
is perhaps indicative of the condition of art: in itself, it is not completable i.e., 
endlessly interpretable. The consequences of such a position - adopted by 
Valery - Gadamer claims is that the recipient is the ultimate authority for the 
criterion of correct reaction and understanding: "one way of understanding a 
. work of art is then no less legitimate than another ... 29 
Such a relativist position, Gadamer argues leaves the recipient as the 
absolute authority, as the genius of understanding instead of the genius of 
creation. What takes place is a transference of the concept of genius from artist 
to beholder. And this solves nothing for even if the beholder is an ordinary 
person, the work of art as fragment offers no appropriate reaction, leading to 
the view that each interpretation of the same work is an interpretation of a new 
work. 
In rejecting Valery's argument, Gadamer does not opt for the Lukacsian 
concept of aesthetic experience: it too is unhelpful. The problem with this view 
is that in emphasizing aesthetic experience, the work of art is considered as an 
empty fonn, itlled in by a succession of experiences, with the following. 
oonsequences: the loss of the identity of the artwork, artist and recipient 
through time. The continuity between each interpretation is broken. 
To refute the Lukacsian position, Gadamer invokes Kierkegaard's 
criticism of the aesthetic stage. Here, I don', think Gadamer'!I move is 
legitimate for Kierkegaard's focus was directed towards an aesthetic existence 
i.e., towards a sensual way of life where one was not committed to any 
particular belief except one's own stance, which serves to show the inherent 
contradictoriness of the aesthetic stage of existence. But what Gadamer needs 
to show with the Lukacsian position is that the work of art as an empty fonn 
filled with meaning by a subject is untenable. The flaw with Lukacs's position 
is that it is object oriented with the object devoid of meaning, whilst 
Kierkegaard's critique is subject oriented so that Gadamer's use of 
Kierkegaard is misplaced. 
That Gadamer needs the Kierkegaardian critique is shown by the 
consequences of this critique. The Kierkegaardian aesthete despairs of his own 
life and feels the need to go beyond this stage, to the ethical sphere. It is from 
29. Ibid., 85. 
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the ethical stage that one is able to see the contradictions inherent in the 
previous stage. Gadamer argues that Kierkegaaid's point here shows how evem 
if the aesthetic stance is untenable "the phenomenon of art imposes a task on 
existence; namely (that) ... of achieving that continuity of self-understanding 
which alone can support human existence.,,30 
This quotation illustrates the kind of knowledge Gadamer expects of art. 
It is a knowledge which throws light upon man himself. The presupposition 
he assumes is that both art and man are the product of historical and cultural . 
contexts. Because man is the product of history , he is not immediately present 
to himself, and cannot therefore know himself. Art is the medium, the 'other' . 
through which man learns about himself. In interpreting art, man interprets' 
bimself.ll The mediation through art is the transportation of oneself to a past 
world. But this in not the timeless world of the aesthetic consciousness. It is 
the leaving of one's home to return home. Any interpretation of a work of art 
needs to consider the background from which the interpreter comes. The past 
engages the present. The differences which the past reveals producos 
knowledge of the present. The present can only be known mediated by the past. 
The value of interpreting art is that "art is knowled,e and that the experience 
of the work ofart is a sharing of this knowledge. ttl 
Obviously, this view entails rejecting the Kantian conception of what 
constitutes knowledge and what constitutes reality. On Kant's account it would 
not be possible to make any claims of knowledge in art. But aesthetics should 
be precisely that which gives access to a kind of knowledge which differs from 
scientific knowledge. The truth of art is the truth of self-knowledge. 
However whilst I sympathize with Gadamer's view that we learn about 
ourselves from the past, the way Gadamer talks about history and tradition 
raises a few questions. In the first case, Gadamer seems to read history in 
Enlightenment terms as a movement towards progress. He does not seem to 
consider that history is frequently the story of much suffering, which repeats 
itself rather than eliminate it. In this case it is debatable as to what thc,.atue 
of such knowledge is towards man's self-understanding. Merely to saytl:i:8t we 
learn about ourselves from the past is not saying very much. So too, tit. is 
30. Ibid., 86 
31. J. Weinsbeimer writes, "benneneutics is wbat makes continuity out of dilCOl11imlity," 
Godomer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of 'TnIIh and Method', (Yale UDivenity Pnm; Now 
Haven 1985) 97. 
32. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 87. 
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the question of history itself. My claim is that history is never a neutral 
narrative. What is perceived as historical data is motivated by ideological 
interests. The history we read today is only a particular perspective which was 
of interest to the historiographers of the time. The claim to objectivity is 
unwarranted since they would have been the product of their own context. 
Since Gadamer considers the past as the only possible way of learning about 
ourselves, it seems that this knowledge would necessarily be distorted. One 
consequence of this view is that historiography becomes an exercise in 
fictional revision. As the collective of The Empire Writes Back point out: 
'~Hayden White (1973) has noted how a long line of European thinkers from 
" Valery and Heidegger to Sartre, Levi-Strauss and Foucault have cast doubts 
ott the claims of an objective historical consciousness and stressed the fictive 
ri8ture of historical reconstruction ... 33 
. Hegel is considered by Gadamer as having a more thorough understanding 
of the experience of art than Kant. Art and history are inter-related and together 
result in truth. The truth which art reveals is the truth of history , of world views. 
Unlike history however, art does not resolve itself into "true art". It is 
sUperceded by world history and the history of philosophy. Still, this should 
not undermine the value of Hegel's contribution, which is precisely that of 
eliminating subjectivity from art. Truth in art is achieved, but superceded by 
the concept i.e., philosophy. 
The defect with Hegelian aesthetics is that it adopts the standpoint of 
infinite knowledge, which sees art as a movement leading to philosophy. 
Gadamer accepts the elimination of Kantian subjectivism from Hegelian 
aesthetics, but on the other hand rejects Hegel by accepting the Kantian view 
that the language of concepts and ends is inapplicable to art. His concern 
ultimately is to show the ontological statUs of the work of art and its truth-value. 
Here the work of Heidegger influences Gadamer. In The Origins of the Work 
of Art, Heidegger claims that a great work of art 'speaks' to us, putting us in 
touch with a truth which we cannot obtain otherwise than through art. The 
expenence of a work of art is the revelation of truth. It is the work that speaks 
to wi; not the artist. 
Likewise Gadamer maintains that the experience of art is the revelation of 
truth. In the experience, he who undergoes it does not leave the work 
fJDchanged. Something has happened to him. The mode of being of the genuine 
wort of art is truth. It is a truth the subject does not possesses because it alters 
33. BiU Ashcroft. Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin. TIle Empire Writes Back (Routledge and 
Kcpn Paul; London 1989) 161. "j 
OADAMERANDSCHOPENHAUER 
him. The truth of art is different to the truth which science acquires at the end 
of methodologicAl inquiry. Rather the subject belongs to the art work such that 
in its experience he understands the truth of his own being. 
3.0 The experience of art. 
When it comes to the experience of art, Schopenhauer and Gadamer have 
more in common than is ever pointed out. Both have as their central thesis the 
loss of the subject-object divide. Indeed, considering that Gadamer does not 
belong to the German Idealist tradition, his concerns on this aspect ate? 
remarkably similar to the concerns of that tradition. Thus, the unity of 
subject-object in the aesthetic experience is for him a central consideration to 
the nature of art and pivotal to his treatment of all the arts. 
Likewise, Schopenhauer - albeit for different reasons - is also 
concerned to relinquish the dichotomy between the subject and object in the 
aesthetic experience. It is, in fact, one of the two ways of achieving temporary 
respite from the trammels of the will. But more than liberation, the aesthetic 
experience constitutes another form of knowledge, one superior to the 
knowledge obtained through science. The procedures and aims of science 
serve to highlight - by contrast - how knowledge is acquired in the arts. In 
its scientific endeavours the intellect is subjected to the rule of the will. The 
purpose of scientific knowledge is to get to know and manipulate objects. In 
this relationship practical purposes determine the relation between intellect 
and will. 
Artistic knowledge differs radically. For a start it is not concerned with 
the things it encounters, but with the universal aspects of these things - the 
Platonic Ideas. Yet the perception of these Ideas require a correlative in the 
individual's mode of being. The individual is no longer interested in the object 
for his own uses. The relation between the intellect and the will is severed: 
"thus it considers thing~ without interest, without subjectivity, purely 
objectively; it is entirely given up to them in so far as they are ~Jely 
representations and not motives. ,,34 . 
The Platonic Idea is a representation requiring a subject. In the perception 
of the Idea, the subject becomes one with the object i.e., the Idea. The absenc'i,. 
of interest towards the object is reminiscent of, and derived from Kant. 1ft tile" 
Critique of Judgement, he wrote that an aesthetic judgement consists of a 
34. Schopcnhauer, 1M World as Will and Representation, 196. 
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"delight or aversion immediately with the bare contemplation of the object 
irrespective of its use or of any end. ,,3S 
Sehopenhauer adopts the notion of aesthetic disinterestedness, although 
he differed from Kant in that the latter was concerned with the harmonious 
interplay of the faculty of the understanding together with the imagination and 
the universality of aesthetic judgements. He did not admit that the aesthetic 
experience was a source of knowledge at all. Indeed, Kant's concern was to 
4·tti8tablish the conditions which enable one to pass an aesthetic judgement. It is 
". ibis point that Heidegger stresses and uses to claim that Schopenhauer 
misunderstood Kant. It is Heidegger's contention that Kant's search for the 
grounds and defmition of the beautiful in terms of disinterestedness is a 
negative aspect. The positive aspect is - having' excluded questions of 
interests, purposes, and practical ends - the encounter with the object "in its 
own stature and worth. ,,36 Whilst Schopenhauer reads disinterestedness as the 
release from the will in its relation to the object, Heidegger claims that 
disinterestedness is the establishment of an essential relation to the object 
itself: "for the ftrst time the object comes to the fore as pure object and that 
such coming forward into appearance is the beautiful. ,,37 
Heidegger's critique still leaves the Schopenhauerian position intact. 
What Heidegger considers as the appearance of the object in its full worth, is 
to Schopenhauer the revelation of the Idea. And Schopenhauer can still 
maintain that the revelation of the Idea requires a corresponding change in the 
su~ject of the experience namely, from that of an individual willing a particular 
objeCt, to that ofa "pure will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge. ,,31 
, The question we return to is that. of establishing in what sense the 
experience of art produces a unity of subject and object. The dissolution of this 
dichotomy is heralded with the advent of the Platonic Ideas, for they include 
within them both subject and object: 
when the Idea appears, subject and object can no longer be distin-
guished in it, because the Idea, the adequate objectivity of the will, 
~s. Kat, Critique ofJudgement, 43. 
36. M. Heideuor, N"ret:llJche:ThB Will To Power As Art, (Harper and Row Publishers; New Yark 
1971) 109. 
37. lbid., 110 
31. Schopenbauor. TIt. World as Will and Reprssenl4tion, 179. 
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the real world as representation arises only when su~ect and object 
reciprocally fill and penetrate each other completely. II 
." 
Knox suggests that on Schopenhauer's own grounds the unity of the 
aesthetic experience is untenable. Each Idea has a different meaning according 
to the place it is accorded in the hierarchy of the arts. Thus, the Idea of man is 
the highest expression of meaning, the lowest being exhibited in architecture. 
Consequently, the aesthetic experience is '~udged only according to the .... 
intensity and clarity with which it apprehends that quality [Idea] .... 40 The errol ' 
with Knox's view is that he equates 'oneness' with 'sameness'. He wants the 
aesthetic experience of each and every object to be qualitively the same. 
However, in itself this objection does nothing to invalidate the unity of the 
aesthetic experience. 
Whilst Schopenhauer's contention remains valid, he does seem to weaken 
his own position when he discusses the question of aesthetic pleasure. In the 
Essays andAphorisms, he argues that this pleasure is precisely the loss of one's 
individual will, of all desiring "when all desire disappears from consciousness 
there still remains the condition of pleasure. ,,41 But when talking about 
pleasure in The World as Will and Representation, he differentiates as to 
whether this pleasure is more pronounced on the will-less subject or on the 
Platonic Idea: "the pleasure ... [arises] ... sometimesmore from the one than from 
the other, according to what the object of aesthetic contemplation may be.,,42 
If the object of aesthetic contemplation is a low graded Idea, such as thOie 
manifested in architecture, then the pleasure arises from the conditioo. of 
will-Iessness; if on the other hand, it is the contemplation of the Idea of mln, 
the pleasure is derived from the Idea. This distinction weakens his claim to the 
unity of the aesthetic experience, for to be able to differentiate and locate, the 
pleasure either in the subject or object means that in effect they are not mUted 
in the aesthetic experience. If they are undifferentiated in the aesthetic 
experience then presumably one cannot distinguish between them. 
Gadamer's way of eliminating the subject-object divide is radically 
different from Schopenbauer. Unlike the latter, he does not have any ultimate 
39. Ibid., 180. 
40. I. Knox, The Aesthetic Theories of Kant. Hegel and Schopen/unler, (The HumanitiOi Pfeu; 
New York 1958) 134. 
41. A. Sehopenhauer, Essays and Aphorisms, (peqguin Classics; Middlesex. 1970) ISS.: 
42. Sebopenhauer, The World as Will andRepresenatatJon., 196. 1 
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reality ftom which 10 escape. Rather his concern is to unify the spectator with 
the object of his experience such that the his own being will be revealed. His 
strategy involves adopting the theme of art as play, a theme frequently adopted 
in the bis10ry of aesthetics. The view he wants to explicate is different from 
the ICandan or Schillerian positions. Indeed, one can say he is arguing against 
their subjectivist considerations of play in art i.e., art as free play of mental 
faculties. In Kant's case, art as the free-play of the imagination with the 
.. UIlderstaading. in Schiller's case, art as the harmonizing play of the form and 
matter impulse. Gadamer's analysis shifts the mode of being of the work of art 
from the subject to the work itself. What he wants to show is how the work 
takes over the subject. To do this he will draw a parallel between the mode of 
being of the work of art and of play. However, it is play that becomes his 
S1arting point, for Gadamer will show how the mode of being of play is only 
(I Darrower conception of that of the work of art. 
Gadamer's primary concern is to show features of play that cannot be 
.classified as subjective. In this way he will shed light on the mode of being of 
play. As a methodological starting point, Gadarner examines the way play is 
used in ordiruuy language: the play of light, the play of forces etc. From its 
actual use, we can note an emphasis on a movement which does not tend 
towards an end. The to-fro sway of play is what defines a game. In this respect, 
it is irrelevant to consider whether it is a subject who plays: "hence the mode 
orbeing of play is not such that there must be a subject who takes up a playing 
~de in order that the game may be played ... 4] 
.. Moreover, the primacy of the game over the subject is brought out be 
another factor: risk. Playing a game involves taking a number of decisions, 
options for certain possibilities. There is therefore a sense offreedom of choice 
which accompanies the game. But the choice entails risking, and this risk is 
what exerts control over the player. It makes the game attractive, and it shows 
thatlbe player is subjected to the game, and not vice-versa. This view is further 
substantiated by what Gadamer calls the "proper spirit" of the game. Each 
game is different and their difference lies precisely in the respective spirit. 
When a particular game is played, a corresponding mental attitude is adopted. 
But what must be recalled is that it is the primacy of the game whose spirit 
induces the respective attitude. It is not the mental attitude which is the cause 
of the difference in games. Each game is determined by a particular attitude 
which differentiates it from other attitudes . 
.. 
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Gadamer has so far provided us with features of play that show its 
independent status: the swaying movement, the proper spirit and risk. It is the 
next point which however underlies the most fundamental feature of playiDg 
a game: seriousness. When one customarily talks of play, the immediate 
reaction is to equate it -as Aristotle does - with recreation. But this equation 
is not exhaustive. The active participation of play is not one ofidleness but of 
seriousness. Not playing seriously is tantamount to not playing. When a game 
is played seriously "the player loses himself in his play.,,44 The loss of self 
serves to show how the game takes over the player. To ask about the player's 
subjectivity is fruitless, for the mode of being of play has an essence 
independent of the subject who plays, and which takes over the subject. "the 
real subject of the game is not the player ... but instead the game itself. ,,~5 What 
he means is that the subject does not stand over and above the object but loses 
himself in it. 
Is Gadamer's critique of subjectivism successful? I would argue that 
Gadamer has established his case against the subjectivist thesis. For a 
subjectivist to be successful, he must defend the claim that the subject is always 
in control, manipulating the game to his own ends. But Gadamer has precisely 
shown the opposite. The characteristic features of play cannot be explained by 
reducing them to a subject. Rather the mode of being of play is such that it 
controls the subject. 
The essence of a game and that of a work of art are not identical. Tiie 
difference lies in their mode of representation. With the game, Gadamer 
argues, that of its nature every game has it own particular space, although ~ 
focuses in particular on those games -children's games -which as such do 
not require an audience. The space which delineates the field of play is 
separated from other areas of human behaviour. It constitutes a self-enclosed 
world. Within the world of the game, no purpose extrinsic to the game itself 
is persued. Its nature is autotelic. One plays to fulfIll the goals of the glQllc; 
These goals are fulfilled by the role or task the game gives to each player: 
"every game presents the man who plays it with a task. ,,46 Its being played is 
its own representation. Having established the nature of play,. 
self-representation, Gadamer goes on to argue that the work ofart.1ike play, 
also has the mode of being of self-representation, but with the fundam~ 
44. Ibid., 92. 
45. Ibid., 95-96. 
46. Ibid., 96. 
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ctifference that it is a representation directed towards an audience. What seems 
dubious about Gadamer's analysis is that it seems to characterize games in too 
narrow a fashion so that it allows him to make the further claim that art is a 
representation -for. Due to his opinion of games, sports are not directed towards 
an audience. What would he say of those games which combine entertainment 
with them -say wrestling and boxing. Would it not be legitimate to hold that 
they are also a representation-for an audience? If this were the case, what is 
the difference between games and works of art? 
Gadamer's paradigm for the representational structure of the work of art 
is likened to the religious rite where a god is represented. Here the players in 
the rite represent a "meaningful whole" for the audience. The audience is 
required to complement the game. The religious or profane drama is an open 
. world, in the sense of an openness towards the spectator. The representation 
. of the game is the representation for someone, although the game is itself a 
closed world. A fundamental shift occurs now, for the players involved as they 
are with their roles, perform for the audience. It is not they who become totally 
absorbed, but the audience. The play is not performed for the player's personal 
delight but for the spectator. This is not to say that the player does not 
experience its significance. It isjust -Gadamermaintains -that the audience 
has methodological precedence. The work of art is essentially a 
representation-for someone, who is neither the playwright and neither the 
actor. The correlate of representation-for is meaning. We do not ask of a game 
what it means, but we do ask it of a performance. The openness of the work of 
art is the openness to the audience of meaning. 
, The Gadamerian position is therefore remarkably similar to the 
SChopenhauerian one. Both display an explicit desire to relocate the aesthetic 
experience within the space of a unity, involving the breakdown of the 
. subject-object dichotomy. For Gadamer, collapsing this dichotomy ensures the 
truth of art, reuniting the subject and object in the interpretation. The work of 
art js experienced as its interpretation. The Gadamerian critique is not 
C<)!lcemed with the subject's loss of individuality. Indeed the way he talks 
about the game despite it controlling the player or the work of art as existing 
only in its interpretation, still leaves room for the subject's individuality. The 
question of individuality is not problematic for Gadamer, since he does not 
have the same premise as SchopeDhauer i.e., that the will dominates the 
individual's life ceaselessly seeking to satisfy its desires. In his case it is 
precisely the loss of individuality which enables art to make a positive 
c6D~bution to human life. 
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4.0 Genius 
The concept of genius is discussed by both Schopenbauer and Gadamer. 
Their views 'on this concept are radically opposed, for on the one hand. 
Schopenhauer eulogizes the genius as he who is in contact with the Platonic 
Ideas translating them into art, whilst on the other hand, Gadamer condemns 
the aesthetics of genius as the root problem - originating in Kant - of 
denouncing claims of truth and knowledge in art. 
Schopenhauer's artistic genius has extraordinary talents which ordinary 
people share in, but to a lesser degree. This talent consists in the ability of 
losing oneself in pure perception i.e., abandoning all subjective interests and 
willing: "the gift of genius is nothing but the most complete objectively i.e., 
the objective tendency of the mind, as opposed to the subjective directed to 
our own person, i.e., the will. "·'This point serves to show that contrary to whU 
many critics claim, Schopenhauer was not a Romanticist for rather than 
glorifYing the self in art and life -one of the assumptions of Romanticism -
he considered the value of artistic genius only insofar as his individuality was 
eliminated. 
With the genius's loss of self, a different kind of knowledge is attained: 
that of the Ideas. It is superior to scientific knowledge on two counts: firstly, 
scientific knowledge works for the will i.e., it seeks to know relations between 
objects for the will's procurement. This is not the sort of knowledge which 
helps the individual achieve peace of mind; secondly the knowledge of the 
Ideas is 'true' knowledge for it is "the true content ofits phenomena, that which 
is subject to no change and is therefore known with equal truth for all time:'·· 
The value of the genius in artistic production was supreme. It was.the 
genius who perceived the Ideas for the necessary duration which allowed him 
to depict them in art. Thus, the purpose genius serves towards the rest of 
humanity is that of communicating the Ideas. Yet in my view the fact that 
Schopenbauer devotes considerable attention to the work of genius as the 
creator of art rather than the glorification of nature shows that the Romanticist 
label frequently attached to Schopenbauer is unfounded. This is why, when 
considering the work of art and natural beauty, though both reveal the Idea. 
the work of art has an edge over natural beauty in that the labour re~ .to 
47. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 18S. 
48. Ibid., 184. 
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perceive the Idea bas been done by the genius: "the work of art is merely a 
means of facilitating that knowledge in which [aesthetic] pleasure consists. ".11 
Even SchopeDhauer's use of the concept of the imagination did not 
conform to i1S Romantic associations. Whereas for the Romantics, the 
imagination was a special gift of the artist, providing him with an immediate 
insight into truth, Schopenhauer considered the imagination a necessary but 
not sufficient condition in the artist's mental framework. The value of the 
imagination was that it helped the artist go beyond the objects of sense 
perception and "extend his horizon far beyond the reality of his personal 
e~rience. and enable him to construct all the rest out of the little that has 
come into his own actual apperception. "so This is Schopenhauer's way of 
saying that the imagination helps the artist see his experience in universal 
terms. The second benefit of the imagination is that it helps the artist perfect 
what imperfect nature produces. The insight behind this is to show that in art, 
the artist does not passively reproduce the objects of his experience, but 
anticipates what they would look like had there been no conflict of the will's 
forms. 
Yet despite Schopenhauer's approval of the imagination, he argues that it 
is not the imagination it~lf that is a mark of genius: "strength of the 
iD;tagination is not evidence of genius ... even men with little or no touch of 
genius may have much imagination ... ~1 His criticism is that the ordinary man's 
imagination is not employed in the perception of the Ideas but misused and 
cmUused with his daydreaming. an escapist ploy, manipulated as a way out of 
his solitude. Only people of a like disposition can approve of these daydreams, 
written and published as novels. 
When discussing the genius's inspiration, Schopenhauer does seem to be 
pronouncing two incompatible positions on the nature of this inspiration. In 
certain passagesSl he emphasizes that in his work the genius is consciously 
reflecting and intentionally reproducing what he perceives. But when talking 
about melody he writes that "the work of genius .. .is far removed from all 
reflection and conscious intention, and might be called an inspiration ... ~3 I 
49. Ibid .• 19S. 
SO. Ibid., ISS. 
Sl~ Ibid., 187. 
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would suggest that the latter view is more in keeping with wWICII". 
says elsewhere in connection with the nature of concepts. The ......... 
who starts with the concept and proceeds to depict it This sort ofl.'-
consciously and deliberately, without any inspiration. So too, IiDce 
from concepts he tends to imitate the works in vogue at the 
ultimately happens is that within a few years when a new trend ia lit. 
would recall his work. The genius. although acknowledging the debt 
predecessor. uses as his material life and the world. so that the cultural 001 •• '
does not determine the originality of his work. The thesis of the timeleu qui ...... 
of the work of art is substantiated with the concept of genius. .' 
Gadamer's interest in the concept of genius stems from the way q 
differentiates between natural and artistic beauty. In the Critiq_ of Judg~' 
Kant maintains a priority of natural beauty over artistic beauty. He jutifJei ~ 
this priority on the grounds that natural beauty .is an expression of a ... ~ 
unintellectualized judgement of taste and hence not related to concepts which 
defme their purposes. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly. the beauty 
of nature is such that it arouses the interest of those persons who are manly 
good; that someone is capable of passing an aesthetic judgment on DatuI8l 
beauty is indicative of his moral worth. 
:. "'i .. ' 
Art also provokes man into facing the moral nature of his existence; U-
the difference between artistic beauty and natural beauty is that the f~ 
exists specifically to confront man with this aspect of his existence, whilJUhe 
latter is there speaking to him without intending to do so. Thai the bea~ 
forms of nature display a purposefulness without being purposeful indiCllr. 
man his position in creation, calling him to his moral being. It is beclUlC. it 
not nature's purpose to be beautiful that man's place in the world is confimioll 
... 
Artistic beauty remains seconded to nature for it is "the ._. 
representation of a thing"s. and is therefore a representation which foIl-.-
established rules. But Kant realized that just following rules docs not 801". 
for creativity. To show how art can present something beyond all COJ •• ~ 
Kant introduced the concept of genius. The irrationality of genius 
the productive creativity of both creator and recipient. Genius COIllelpeI'" 
the playful faculty of one's mental powers, which goes beyond rigiclldb" 
to rules in the process of creating new models. 
Yet despite the introduction of the concept of genius, --... 
remained superior to art. The second part of the Critiq_ of.hM_~ 
S4. Kant, Critiqueo/Judgement, 166. 
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exclusively with nature. And even though art is defined by reference to genius, 
this only serves to bring art back to natural beauty "through genius, nature 
gives the rule to art. "ssQadamer maintains that until Kant there was no opening 
for philosophy of art. But after him, art rather than natural beauty attained 
prominence. The relationship between the ideas of taste and genius changed, 
so that genius predominated. Questions of taste in relation to art lose their 
significance for taste is a levelling process, unconcerned with the unusual or 
original in art. The creativity of genius, on the other hand, with its capacity for 
innovation contributes to art. Kant's notions of the perfect taste in art 
resembled the concept of genius. Perfect taste was the attempt to achieve a 
defmite unchangeable form, in so doing becoming eternal. It was particularly 
inapplicable to natural beauty, for nothing was priveleged within nature: "Is 
there anything ugly in nature?"SCI Gadamer points out that even in art, the idea 
of perfect taste is troubling: 
one does violence to the concept of taste if one does not include it in 
its variability. Ifit is anything, taste is testimony to the chan~eableness 
of all human things and the relativity of all human values. 7 
Genius is more appropriate to the understanding of art, for it allows the 
:work of art to remain changeless through time. Taste becomes that quality 
which artistic genius possesses, so that Kant opens the way for the glorification 
of art at the expense of nature. Fichte and Schelling adopted this perspective 
of art as the unconscious production of genius, embracing within itself even 
nature. The natural world was translated into art so that - Hegel maintained 
- the encounter with a work of art was the encounter with another human 
spirit. The eternal nature of art was transmitted throughout time through the 
medium of genius . 
. Subsequent reactions to Hegel led to a return to Kant, but by now art and 
genius became firmly entrenched, whilst taste became peripheral. Under the 
Romantic movement, the concept of genius as the unconscious producer was 
no lbnger restricted to the artist, but became a universal concept of value. 
The results of Gadamer's investigation show an important consideration: 
the standpoint of eternity in relation to art attained this position as a 
consequence of Kant's adoption of genius as the creator of art. It is the 
55 .. Ibid., 166-168. 
56. Oadamer, Truth and Method, 53. 
57. Ibid., 53 . 
.... ,!!. 
GADAMER AND SCHOPENHAUEIt 
aesthetics of genius which have led to the movement where die 
beholder were distanced from the work of art. 
5.0 Conclusions 
The central argument of this paper has been to show that de.,. 
apparent similarity of their claims, Schopenhauer and Gadamer di1f. 
regards to the content of these claims. 
·1 
Thus, both agree that it is legitimate to discuss the question of truth ~ 
knowledge in art. But whilst for Schopenhauer, it is the truth and knowloqe . 
of the Ideas, which in tum manifest the will and therefore reality, Gadam.'. 
considerations on art show how it is the medium through which man 1 __ ' 
about the truth of his historical nature. It is therefore an essential part- 01 . ~.; 
Gadamer's concern to repudiate the thesis of the timelessness of art, for 1hiI .. " 
would invalidate the historical grounding upon which his thesis rests. . .-
Schopenhauer's support for the timelessness of art is constructed amacl 
the metaphysic of the will. The world as representation, subject to space, timo. 
and causality, is one of endless suffering. Art is time less precisely becauIe it 
enables the viewer to seek temporary peace in its experience. This is what 
constitutes the unity of subject and object in aesthetic contemp~ 
Becoming one with the Idea liberates the subject. Gadamer is also cone ... 
with uniting the subject and object, but uses the concept of play to in~ 
how the subject forgets himself in his playing. His further contention ii,... 
when the play of art takes over the spectator, this becomes a revelation of~ 
The work of art is of its nature a representation-for-an-audience. . ~;. 
--,v 
So too, the concept of genius reflects the different concerns of6od1 
philosophers. To Schopenhauer, the genius is he who makes the Plato~'{ ~ 
accessible to the rest of humanity. In his inspiration, the genius l~ -
individuality, and produces the timeless work of art. Gadamer's  
analysis of the development of the aesthetics of genius after Kant. isalUlllll .. 
manuoevre which serves as a pivot for his critique of the sutdec:~tivizll"'lW 
art. Gadamer shows how Kant's notion of perfect taste was inapplicablt 
for taste was relative to its context Works of art were previOusly 1boID 
were not context dependent The achievement of an unchangeable 
only made possible by the genius. It was he who made art ctcrD8L 
post-Kantian philosophers of art adopted the Kantian concept of . 
expense of taste. With the concept of genius, art became sulrioc=U,e. 
examines the specific artforms differences recur, for SC}lop __ 
artform according to the Ideas it depicts, the iOle exc~ep11~ 
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artform of music, through which one is acquainted with the will itself. 
Gadamer's concern is to show how with each artform, the being of each work 
of art reveals truth. It is as such not a theory of what it is that makes a work 
into a work of art, but rather an explanation of how a work of art reveals 
something t' .. 
GADAMERANDSCHOPENHAUER 
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